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Competitions are ubiquitous. At work, we vie for a pro-
motion, seek to increase a company’s market share, or try 
to win the race to patent a new invention. In the social 
domain, we may try to increase our number of Facebook 
“friends,” run faster than another at the gym, or strive to 
outdo the Joneses. Indeed, people commonly seek to 
achieve a superior position vis-à-vis others in a variety of 
contexts, from daily social situations to organizational set-
tings and market transactions (De Botton, 2004; Festinger, 
1954; Frank, 1985; Podolny, 2005; Porter, 1979). Although 
past psychological research valued the study of competi-
tion (Deutsch, 1949; Gardner, 1939; Hastorf & Cantril, 
1954; Triplett, 1898; Vaughn & Diserens, 1938; Whittemore, 
1924, 1925), social comparison scholarship has paid rela-
tively little attention to this important social dynamic in 
recent decades. Instead, much of the study of competition 
has been relinquished to other disciplines—most notably 
economics and business but also sociology, political sci-
ence, and more (e.g., Axelrod, 1984, 1997; Carlton & 
Perloff, 2005; Podolny, 2005; Porter, 1979; Spence, 1973). 
This state of affairs might appear perplexing, given 
Festinger’s (1954) prominent linking of the social com-
parison process to competitive behavior. That early link-
age, however, was followed by much research that 
primarily studied the self-evaluation process—that is, how 
people evaluate their present state relative to others (e.g., 
Beach & Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 1988)—rather than its con-
sequences for competitive behavior per se. The present 
framework therefore synthesizes early developments in 
social comparison theory with more recent ones into a 
coherent account of the key psychological forces that 
increase social comparison and, in turn, competitiveness.
We draw not only on research that has directly exam-
ined competition but also on studies in social compari-
son and related fields that have significant implications 
for its analysis. Moreover, although our framework 
emphasizes the role of social comparison in increasing 
competitiveness, we recognize that competition—like 
other complex behavioral phenomena—is multiply deter-
mined. This review focuses on the role of individual and 
situational factors that increase social comparison con-
cerns and thus competitiveness. In developing the frame-
work of the model, we link social comparison and 
504114 PPSXXX10.1177/1745691613504114Garcia et al.Psychology of Competition
research-article2013
Corresponding Author:
Stephen M. Garcia, University of Michigan, 4126 Weill Hall, Ann 
Arbor, MI 48109 
E-mail: smgarcia@umich.edu
The Psychology of Competition:  
A Social Comparison Perspective
Stephen M. Garcia1, Avishalom Tor2, and Tyrone M. Schiff1
1University of Michigan and 2University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Social comparison—the tendency to self-evaluate by comparing ourselves to others—is an important source of 
competitive behavior. We propose a new model that distinguishes between individual and situational factors that 
increase social comparison and thus lead to a range of competitive attitudes and behavior. Individual factors are 
those that vary from person to person: the relevance of the performance dimension, the similarity of rivals, and 
their relationship closeness to the individual, as well as the various individual differences variables relating to social 
comparison more generally. Situational factors, conversely, are those factors on the social comparison landscape that 
affect similarly situated individuals: proximity to a standard (i.e., near the number 1 ranking vs. far away), the number 
of competitors (i.e., few vs. many), social category fault lines (i.e., disputes across vs. within social categories), and 
more. The distinction between individual and situational factors also helps chart future directions for social comparison 
research and generates new vistas across psychology and related disciplines.
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competitiveness, organize the extant literature to account 
for both individual and situational factors, highlight the 
interactions within and between these factors, and, 
finally, suggest future directions and lessons for fields 
within psychology and related disciplines.
Social Comparison and 
Competitiveness
According to social comparison theory, individuals 
(“actors”) are propelled by a basic drive—the “unidirec-
tional drive upward”—to improve their performance 
and simultaneously minimize or preempt discrepancies 
between their and other persons’ (“targets”) level of per-
formance. This “action to reduce discrepancies interacts 
with the unidirectional push to do better and better” 
(Festinger, 1954, p. 125) and generates “competitive behav-
ior to protect one’s superiority” (Festinger, 1954, p. 126). 
Thus, competitiveness is one manifestation of the social 
comparison process.
The direction of social comparison has been studied 
extensively. For example, upward comparison—when 
actors compare their performance, say, at racquetball 
with targets who are somewhat better—leads to competi-
tive behavior (Hoffman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954; 
Seta, 1982; Tesser, 1988). Actors may be competitive also 
toward targets that presently offer a downward compari-
son—say, targets who perform somewhat worse at rac-
quetball but threaten a potential upward comparison 
(Festinger, 1954; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006). We thus 
define the term comparison concerns as the desire to 
achieve or maintain a superior relative position. Our 
model also defines competitiveness broadly. In many of 
the studies we reference, social comparison or competi-
tiveness was not explicitly measured. We therefore draw 
on a number of behavioral and attitudinal indicators 
associated with competitiveness, noting that we cannot 
conclude that comparison concerns always drive these 
indicators. Such behaviors and attitudes include competi-
tive behavior (C. Johnson, 2012), competitive motivation 
(Tauer & Harackiewicz, 1999), the desire to win (Malhotra, 
2010), positional concerns (Graf, Konig, Enders, & 
Hungenber, 2012; Solnick & Hemenway, 1998), unwill-
ingness to maximize joint gains (Armstrong & Collopy, 
1996), duplicitous behavior (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008), 
lying (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006), harmful behavior 
(Poortvliet, 2012), other enhancement (Shepperd & Arkin, 
1991), hostile attitudes (White, Schmitt, & Langer, 2006), 
biased recommendations (Garcia, Song, & Tesser, 2010), 
and more. The basic dynamic highlighted by the social 
comparison model of competition is that two basic sets 
of factors—namely, individual and situational factors—
are capable of increasing competiveness, across the vari-
ous indicators, by raising social comparison concerns 
(see Fig. 1).
The Model: Individual Versus 
Situational Factors
Historically, the literature focused on three variables that 
increase comparison concerns (Festinger, 1954; Goethals 
& Darley, 1977; J. Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Tesser, 1988). 
First, these concerns intensify with the relevance of 
a performance dimension (“dimension”) to the actor 
(Hoffman et al., 1954; Tesser, 1988), such as performance 
in sports, income, or academics. Second is the degree of 
the actor’s similarity to the target (Goethals & Darley, 
1977; Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010), meaning that sim-
ilar rivals exhibit greater comparison concerns than those 
less similar. The third variable is the degree of the actor’s 
relationship closeness to the target (Pleban & Tesser, 
1981; Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Smith, 1980), where com-
parison concerns are stronger when the target is interper-
sonally close (e.g., a friend or sibling).
It is important to note that one common feature 
of relevance, similarity, and closeness is their highly 
SITUATIONAL FACTORS INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
COMPARISON
CONCERNS
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BEHAVIOR
Fig. 1. The social comparison model of competition: The basic building blocks. Individual factors, encompassed by situ-
ational factors, together influence the degree of comparison concerns and thus competitive behavior.
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individualized nature. Their impact naturally varies even 
among comparably situated people, as these three vari-
ables all reflect actors’ special relationship to either 
dimension or target. For instance, the relevance of a 
potential social comparison—say, regarding math knowl-
edge or tennis skills—can differ greatly among compara-
bly situated actors. Such actors are also likely to hold 
divergent personal perceptions of the similarity of 
a potential target or its relationship closeness. More 
recently, researchers also began exploring the role of 
individual differences in variables that affect actors’ gen-
eral tendency to engage in social comparison (Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999). The triangle at the center of Figure 2 illus-
trates the different types of individual factors, distinguish-
ing between personal factors (e.g., individual differences 
and relevance) that concern actors’ general propensity to 
engage in social comparison and their perceptions of the 
dimension and relational factors (e.g., similarity, relation-
ship closeness, and, provisionally, personal history) that 
refer to the actors’ perceptions of their relationship to the 
target.
However, notwithstanding the importance of individ-
ual factors, which traditionally dominated social compari-
son research, more recent findings have revealed the 
significant contribution of a new set of background situ-
ational factors to social comparison processes. Unlike 
their individual counterparts, situational factors concern 
actors’ perceptions of the surrounding social environ-
ment and therefore can exert a more universal effect on 
comparably situated actors. Figure 2 illustrates how these 
situational factors form the backdrop for the actor’s per-
ception of both dimension and target.
Incentive structures, for one, are a common set of situ-
ational variables that can influence the social comparison 
process. “Zero-sum” situations, for example, where one 
party’s gain is another’s loss, may naturally and rationally 
increase actors’ concerns about their relative position. Yet 
beyond the likely effects of incentive structures, the lit-
erature recently has identified three additional situational 
factors that affect social comparison and competitiveness: 
proximity to a standard (e.g., Garcia et al., 2006; Poortvliet, 
Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2009; Poortvliet, 
2012), number of competitors (e.g., Garcia & Tor, 2009; 
Tor & Garcia, 2010), and social category fault lines (e.g., 
Bornstein, Gneezy, & Nagel, 2002; Garcia, Tor, Bazerman, 
& Miller, 2005; Hogg, 2000; Lount & Phillips, 2007). 
Comparison concerns and competitiveness increase, first, 
in the proximity of a meaningful standard for compari-
son, such as the number one ranking or another qualita-
tive performance threshold; second, as the number of 
competitors decreases; and third, when actors compare 
themselves with targets across social categories (e.g., 
Americans vs. the French) as opposed to intracategory 
targets (e.g., Americans vs. other Americans). What is 
Incentive
Structures
Proximity to a
StandardSocial Category
Fault Lines
Similarity
Closeness
Target Dimension
Actor
INDIVIDUAL
FACTORS
SITUATIONAL
FACTORS
Individual Differences
Relevance
Number of
Competitors
Fig. 2. The social comparison model of competition: Relationships between and within individual and situational factors. 
Individual factors, both personal and relational, are represented on the triangle. The personal factors are listed on the line 
connecting actor and dimension; the relational factors are listed on the line connecting actor to target. The dashed lined 
connecting target and dimension would reflect the target’s personal factors. The situational factors (number of competitors, 
incentive structures, social category fault lines, proximity to a standard) encircle the triangle.
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important about these more recent findings is that they 
also suggest that additional situational factors similarly 
may influence competitiveness via the social comparison 
processes, as we illustrate below with respect to the vari-
ables of audience and uncertainty.
Our focus on situational factors—which comprise 
more stable features of the competitive landscape and 
thus tend to exert a more uniform impact on comparably 
situated actors—helps address the long-standing criticism 
that social comparison “theory lacks the predictive power 
necessary for it to play the central role it perhaps 
deserves” (D. M. Taylor, Moghaddam, & Bellerose, 1989, 
p. 500; see also Arrowood, 1978). To wit, the identified 
effects of situational factors make it easier to predict cir-
cumstances that increase comparison concerns and com-
petitiveness, beyond the idiosyncratic effects of those 
long familiar individual factors. We do not suggest, how-
ever, that situational changes cannot influence individual 
factors or that situational factors do not operate through 
the actor’s subjective perceptions. For example, individ-
ual factors can be shaped indirectly by the surrounding 
social environment, as where the situation leads actors 
(e.g., students) to consider relevant a given dimension 
(e.g., test performance). Yet even in these cases, individ-
ual factors remain distinctly individual—concerning 
direct perceptions of the actor–target or actor–dimension 
relationship rather than the surrounding social situation 
itself. Likewise, situational factors remain situational—
concerning the actor’s perceptions of the social situa-
tion—although inevitably they are subjectively construed 
(e.g., Tor & Garcia, 2010).
Individual Factors of Competitiveness
The individual variables that affect competitiveness can 
be divided into personal factors, such as individual differ-
ences and the relevance of the performance dimension 
versus relational factors, namely, actors’ perceptions of 
their similarity, relationship closeness, and personal his-
tory with their targets.
Personal factors
Individual differences. A host of personality variables 
influence one’s tendency toward exhibiting comparison 
concerns and competitiveness, most notably social com-
parison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) and com-
petitive dispositions (Houston, Mcintire, Kinnie, & Terry, 
2002). This category also includes individuals’ orientation 
toward performance goals (Darnon, Dompnier, & Poortv-
liet, 2012; Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 
2009) and away from mastery goals (Summers, Schallert, & 
Ritter, 2003), as well as other individual differences relat-
ing to social comparison tendencies and competitiveness.
Dimension relevance. People compete on dimensions 
that are relevant or important to the self. For example, 
recreational tennis is relevant to most recreational tennis 
players, return on investment is relevant to most invest-
ment bankers, and academic performance is relevant to 
most students. An early study manipulated dimension rel-
evance by giving participants the impression that an ini-
tial verbal test score was or was not highly relevant to 
their intelligence (Hoffman et al., 1954). Results showed 
that participants who believed that the initial verbal task 
was relevant to their intelligence behaved significantly 
more competitively in a subsequent bargaining task 
toward a slightly better performing confederate than par-
ticipants who believed the initial task irrelevant to intel-
ligence. Similarly, another experiment found that 
participants were less likely to provide helpful clues to 
their friends in a “Password” game that supposedly was a 
measure of intelligence (Tesser & Smith, 1980). Other 
results showed participants to provide more hostile eval-
uations of rivals when these rivals outperformed them on 
self-relevant dimensions (Salovey & Rodin, 1984).
Related research has recently taken an interesting turn 
under the banner of identity-based motivation (Britt, 
2005; Destin & Oyserman, 2009; Oyserman & Destin, 
2010). These studies illustrate that merely implanting or 
evoking an identity can lead to increased motivation and 
better performance on dimensions relevant to that iden-
tity. For example, children from predominantly low-
income African American households who were primed 
with “education-dependent adult identities” (i.e., given a 
graph of median wage information by level of education: 
no high school degree through graduate school), relative 
to those primed with “non-education-dependent adult 
identities” (i.e., wages of entertainers or athletes), were 
eight times more likely to do extra-credit work (Destin & 
Oyserman, 2010).
Relational factors
Similarity. As the perceived similarity of target to actor 
increases, so do comparison concerns and thus competi-
tiveness. Similarity refers both to similarity in terms of abil-
ity or performance on the comparison dimension 
(Festinger, 1954, p. 120). For instance, two golfers are 
similar to the extent that their performance is similar. Yet 
similarity can also refer to similarity of personal character-
istics or attributes more generally, beyond the specific 
comparison dimension. Experiments in this vein (Goethals 
& Darley, 1977) showed that people tend to compare 
themselves with others who are most similar to them along 
a number of different attributes that are not necessarily 
relevant to the specific comparison context (e.g., “dot esti-
mation ability” that was determined by false feedback; 
D. T. Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988). Thus, two 
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academics who are both persons of color, from the same 
university, from a similar PhD vintage, and working in the 
same field are highly similar in terms of personal charac-
teristics and are more likely prone toward mutual social 
comparison.
The inclination to compare with similar others—
whether in terms of performance or characteristics—
begets competitive behavior toward them. To illustrate, 
one experiment found that competitive performance—
measured by reaction time to a geometric-shape recogni-
tion task—increased with the degree of performance 
similarity with a rival in competitive situations (Dakin & 
Arrowood, 1981). To the extent that hostility is related to 
competitiveness, “horizontal hostility” research (White & 
Langer, 1999; White et al., 2006) has showed that com-
parison concerns increase among similar minority groups, 
who strive to see their own group as superior to another, 
similar group. Among similar minority groups, the one 
that is further removed from the mainstream harbors 
greater hostility to its less extreme minority counterparts. 
Examples include vegans’ greater hostility attitudes 
toward vegetarians (White et al., 2006) or punks’ more 
hostile attitudes toward gothics (White et al., 2006). 
However, comparison concerns brought about by simi-
larity among groups also generate competitive rivalry. 
For example, an analysis of a data set on National 
Collegiate Athletic Association basketball teams found 
that a greater similarity among teams—in terms of geo-
graphic proximity, performance histories, and academic 
quality—led to more intense experiences of rivalry and 
competitiveness for their players (Kilduff et al., 2010).
Relationship closeness. Intuition suggests that people 
promote friends over strangers; yet research has showed 
that this is not necessarily true on relevant comparison 
dimensions, because relationship closeness amplifies com-
parison concerns and thus competitiveness (Tesser, 1988; 
Tesser & Campbell, 1982). For example, studies have 
found that participants provided fewer helpful clues to 
friends than to strangers on competitive tasks that were 
self-relevant (Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Smith, 1980). Further 
studies found that people feel more threatened by the suc-
cess of their friends than by that of strangers (Zuckerman 
& Jost, 2001). Finally, in the naturally occurring setting of a 
triathlon race, contestants who maintained a personalized 
comparison—defined in part as “a close or emotional rela-
tionship with the target” (Locke, 2007, p. 213)—had better 
finishing times than those who made more abstract, gen-
eralized comparisons (Locke, 2007).
Prospective outlook
These findings illustrate how personal and relational 
individual factors that naturally vary among comparably 
situated actors can shape comparison concerns and, con-
sequently, competitiveness. Our list, of course, is not 
exclusive, and future research will likely identify addi-
tional individual factors that exert comparable effects. 
For example, consider personal history.
Personal history is another potential individual, rela-
tional factor (e.g., Weiss & Rupp, 2011). Kilduff et al. 
(2010), for instance, predicted that “rivalry will be posi-
tively related to the ‘competitiveness’ of prior contests” 
(p. 948) and found that the unique history of paired 
teams was a better predictor of the intensity of the rivalry 
between them than their most recent matchup. Political 
science research (Stinnett & Diehl, 2001) has also sug-
gested that longer-term rivalries can be a product of “a 
joint history. . . . [T]he initial interactions in a rivalry often 
set the tone for future confrontations” ( J. P. Klein, Goertz, 
& Diehl, 2006, p. 335). These observations, however, 
have yet to be linked directly to comparison concerns.
Situational Factors of Competitiveness
The mostly recent identification of situational factors of 
social comparison, including incentive structures, prox-
imity to a standard, number of competitors, social cate-
gory fault lines, audience, and uncertainty, sheds new 
light on social comparison research.
Incentive structures
Various factors associated with the structure of the specific 
competition, including the direct incentives it offers actors 
to engage in comparison, influence the level of compari-
son concerns and thus competiveness. For example, 
higher expected values (Cole, Bergin, & Whittaker, 2008) 
can increase comparison concerns and competitiveness. 
Similarly, “zero-sum” situations, where one party’s gain is 
another’s loss, naturally increase actors’ comparison con-
cerns and competitiveness (Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 
2001; Lawler, 2003; Mittone & Savadori, 2009). A common 
example that emerges in the classroom is whether the 
course is graded on a curve or absolute scale, with the 
former producing more competitiveness than the latter. 
The following paragraphs, however, examine in greater 
detail those situational factors that shape comparison con-
cerns even in the absence of direct incentives for social 
comparison.
Proximity to a standard
Rankings permeate many facets of society—from U.S. 
News & World Report’s rankings of colleges, through the 
Fortune 500 and Billboard charts to the “Best in Group” 
rankings of the Westminster Kennel Club. Yet rankings 
differentially increase competition. Studies found that 
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comparison concerns and competitiveness intensify in 
the proximity to a standard, whether the number one 
ranking or another meaningful, qualitative threshold, 
such as being in the last place or proximate to some cut-
off point on a scale, but not away from a standard (e.g., 
Garcia et al., 2006; Poortvliet et al., 2009; Vandegrift & 
Holaday, 2012; Zink et al., 2008). An analysis of player 
trades in Major League Baseball, for example, found that 
highly ranked teams (in the proximity of the standard of 
the number one ranking) were less willing than interme-
diately ranked teams to trade with each other “high threat 
players” (whose baseball statistics were outstanding), 
suggesting that competitiveness was stronger between 
highly ranked teams than between intermediately ranked 
ones (Garcia & Tor, 2007).
Similarly, participants indicated that they would behave 
more competitively—preferring an equal but less profit-
able payoff (i.e., $500 to self vs. $500 to rival) over a 
more profitable payoff that paid their rival more ($600 to 
self vs. $800 to rival)—when both parties were highly 
ranked than when they were intermediately ranked 
(Garcia & Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). Further analysis 
showed that this between-subjects’ difference was driven 
largely by an increase in comparison concerns (Garcia 
et al., 2006). The same effect was replicated in a payoff 
choice in which the profit-maximizing option required 
additional effort (Vandegrift & Holaday, 2012). Recent 
research (P. Chen, Myers, Kopelman, & Garcia, 2012) 
further found that facial expressions of highly ranked 
individuals appear more competitive than those of inter-
mediately ranked ones.
Competitiveness also can intensify near other thresh-
olds, such as bottom rankings (Garcia et al., 2006; 
Poortvliet, 2012; Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van 
de Vliert, 2009). In one study (Poortvliet et al., 2009), 
participants were given false feedback about their rank-
ing on a winter survival task (D. W. Johnson & Johnson, 
2000)—4th, 51st, or 96th position of the top 100 (high, 
intermediate, or bottom rank)—and then interacted with 
another participant who scored the 5th, 52nd, or 97th 
position on the top 100, respectively. Results showed that 
participants with performance goals (seeking to outper-
form others) had fewer intentions to exchange informa-
tion when they and their counterpart were ranked highly 
or near the bottom than when they were intermediately 
ranked. What is remarkable is that this same pattern 
emerged when individuals were allowed to harm anoth-
er’s task performance (Poortvliet, 2012). It is interesting 
to note, however, that participants with mastery goals 
(seeking to improve one’s performance) may be less 
competitive with bottom rankings but remain competi-
tive near the top, like their performance-oriented peers 
(Poortvliet, 2012; Poortvliet et al., 2009).
Number of competitors
One ubiquitous feature of competitions is the number of 
competitors. Yet how exactly does our competitiveness 
change as the number of competitors changes? Are we 
more motivated to compete on exams, in a sales office, or 
on the treadmill at the gym as the number of competitors 
decreases? Research has showed the number of competi-
tors (N) to be an important situational factor of social 
comparison. Previously, a number of studies found that 
the intensity of competitive behavior increases as 
N decreases, but these studies generally confounded 
expected payoff with the number of competitors: as N 
decreased, expected value increased. For example, auc-
tion bidders have a greater tendency to exceed their bid-
ding limits when vying against a few versus many bidders 
for one object (Ku et al., 2005). A study of the game show 
Weakest Link (Pillutla & Ronson, 2005) found that contes-
tants behaved more competitively toward other contes-
tants as the number of players decreased in subsequent 
rounds. And research on tournaments (Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno, 1990) has found the same pattern (see also 
Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011; Casas-Arce & 
Martínez-Jerez, 2009). However, in all these settings, the 
diminished N changes the payoff structure of the competi-
tion (Vandegrift & Holaday, 2012) and leaves open the 
possibility that the increased competitiveness observed is 
caused by the higher expected payoffs with decreased 
Ns—that is, by the incentive structure of the competition.
Research on the N effect (Garcia & Tor, 2009; Tor & 
Garcia, 2010), however, found that comparison concerns 
intensify and competitiveness increases as the number of 
competitors decreases, even when controlling for overall 
expected payoffs. For instance, in an analysis of SAT data 
at the state level for all 50 U.S. states, researchers tested 
the prediction that the lower the average number of test 
takers per venue in a state, the higher that state’s average 
SAT score. By dividing the total number of test takers per 
state by the total number of test-taking opportunities in 
that state, a “test-taking density” variable was created. As 
predicted, when controlling for various demographic fac-
tors, a significant inverse relationship between test-taking 
density and state-level average SAT scores emerged 
(Garcia & Tor, 2009).
To examine the N effect in a controlled setting, one 
study recruited undergraduates to complete a short, easy 
quiz in an aggregated pool of 10 or 100 competitors, with 
a monetary incentive for speed without compromising 
accuracy (Garcia & Tor, 2009). As predicted, participants 
finished the quiz significantly faster in the 10-competitors 
than in the 100-competitors condition, without a signifi-
cant difference in accuracy. One reason for the effect of 
N on the competitiveness is that comparison concerns 
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decrease with N. Indeed, people harbor fewer compari-
son concerns and lose interest in comparison information 
as N increases (Garcia & Tor, 2009; Tor & Garcia, 2010). 
Therefore, notwithstanding the potential contribution of 
additional mechanisms (see Mukherjee & Hogarth, 2010; 
Tor & Garcia, 2010), comparison concerns significantly 
drive the N effect.
Other research findings also suggest that comparison 
concerns decrease with N. For example, personalized 
comparisons to a specific individual lead to greater 
increases in the motivation to compete than do compari-
sons to people more generally (Buckingham & Alicke, 
2002; W. M. P. Klein, 2003; Locke, 2007). W. M. P. Klein 
(2003) found that people behaved more competitively 
and were less willing to provide helpful hints on a feed-
back task when their performance was compared with a 
“single other” versus the “average other.” Dubbed the 
local dominance effect (Zell & Alicke, 2010), this work 
likewise describes how local social comparison informa-
tion is likely to carry more weight than global compari-
son information and may contribute to the stronger social 
comparison concerns one finds in smaller-N settings.
Social category fault lines
Much like other situational factors, comparisons across 
social category fault lines (such as gender: female vs. 
male; university: Michigan vs. Ohio State University; or 
companies: Wells Fargo vs. Bank of America) increase 
comparison concerns and competitiveness, relative to 
comparisons made within social category fault lines (i.e., 
female vs. female, Michigan vs. Michigan, Wells Fargo vs. 
Wells Fargo).1 Social category fault lines initially may 
seem like a relational factor because they concern actors’ 
perceptions of their relationship with targets and social 
category memberships vary among individuals (e.g., gen-
der, ethnicity, profession, and so on). Further analysis 
makes clear, however, that this factor belongs among the 
situational variables of social comparison. Each individ-
ual simultaneously belongs to a multitude of nonexclu-
sive social categories (e.g., a female, an African American, 
a lawyer, a Catholic, a New Yorker, an American, and so 
on), to which they self-categorize depending on the situ-
ation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
The same actor–target–dimension triangle depicted in 
Figure 2 therefore may generate very different social 
comparison outcomes depending on the particular social 
category fault line made salient by the specific back-
ground environment in which the comparison takes 
place. For example, an actor may self-categorize as being 
from “Michigan” versus a target from “Ohio State” and 
thus behave competitively when in the United States, yet 
categorize himself and the target both as “Americans” and 
consequently behave less competitively toward the target 
if the same interaction were to take place, say, in Europe. 
In other words, the situation highlights social category 
fault lines, which in turn shape the actor’s perceptions of 
the relationship with the target.
Self-categorization necessarily requires social compari-
son (Hogg, 2000; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1975). Foundational 
research in this area (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) focused on payoffs 
across social-category lines and implicated comparison 
concerns as predictors of competitive behavior. Examining 
mixed motives in intergroup settings (Tajfel et al., 1971; 
Turner et al., 1979), for instance, researchers found that 
maximizing difference in group payoffs—rather than 
maximizing either the joint profits of all groups or one’s 
in-group profit—characterized these intergroup settings, 
even when entailing both personal and group sacrifice 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1979). More generally, 
although intergroup transactions do not always lead to 
competitive behavior (Brewer, 1999; Halevy, Bornstein, & 
Sagiv, 2008), comparison concerns, which strongly mani-
fest across social-category lines, tend to increase com-
petitiveness in these settings (Garcia & Miller, 2007; 
Munkes & Diehl, 2003).
Earlier research in this area, however, exclusively 
focused on allocations across social-category lines, with-
out controlling for the baseline competitiveness of alloca-
tions within a social category. To this end, University of 
Michigan (UM) students read about a hotel vacancy 
dilemma in which UM and Harvard students were travel-
ing together (Garcia et al., 2005; see also Garcia, 
Bazerman, Kopelman, Tor, & Miller, 2010). Participants 
were asked to recommend one of two solutions: (Option 
A) UM and Harvard students stay at a one-star motel or 
(Option B) UM students stay at a two-star hotel and 
Harvard students stay at a four-star hotel. Results showed 
that UM students tended to choose Option A and were 
less likely to maximize hotel quality in the across-social-
category-lines condition compared with those in the con-
trol condition (involving two UM groups).
Other studies found that an in-group member is more 
motivated to compete when outperformed by an out-
group competitor than by another in-group member and 
that social comparison is a necessary precondition for 
this effect (Lount & Phillips, 2007). Moreover, the organi-
zational literature suggests that adding a reference out-
group helps eliminate free riding within a group, as 
in-group members’ competitiveness increases, leading 
them to perform better (Bornstein & Erev, 1994; Bornstein, 
Erev, & Rosen, 1990; Erev, Bornstein, & Galili, 1993) and 
coordinate more effectively (Bornstein et al., 2002) once 
social category fault lines become salient.
Prospective outlook
The preceding findings illustrate how some established 
situational factors can amplify comparison concerns and 
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competitiveness. Two additional factors we believe merit 
further consideration in this category are audience and 
uncertainty.
Audience. Suppose that a handful of professionals are 
contending in, say, a pogo stick competition. Would the 
competitors experience an increase in comparison con-
cerns and thus exhibit even more competitiveness with 
an audience present? The social facilitation literature has 
showed that audiences increase competitive pressure, 
enhancing performance on well-learned tasks (Cottrell, 
Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968) and undermining perfor-
mance on difficult tasks (Zajonc & Sales, 1966; see also 
Beilock, 2011). Although the dominant view was that an 
audience increased evaluation apprehension (Cottrell et 
al., 1968), later research implicated social comparison 
processes among the mediators of facilitation (C. F. Bond 
& Titus, 1983; Geen, 1989; Muller, Atzeni, & Butera, 2004; 
Sanders, Baron, & Moore, 1978). Thus, we can infer that 
an audience increases comparison concerns and thus 
competitive behavior.
For example, in a weight-lifting competition among 
recreationally trained lifters, competitors lifted signifi-
cantly more weight in the presence of an audience than 
otherwise (Rhea, Landers, Alvar, & Arent, 2003). Moreover, 
in online auctions, competing bidders that were visible to 
a virtual audience tended to improve their results and 
stay in the auction longer than did those bidders in the 
control condition (Rafaeli & Noy, 2002). However, besides 
these two examples, extant research has focused on indi-
viduals performing alone, with or without an audience in 
a noncompetitive setting. Further research, however, 
could establish more generally an audience–comparison–
competiveness link in competitive settings as well.
Uncertainty. Uncertainty in the environment—such as 
when the quantity or future of a resource is uncertain, 
when the identity of one’s competitors is unknown, and 
so on—is another situational factor that may increase 
competitiveness via comparison concerns. In many 
competitions we enter, uncertainty in the environment 
abounds. For instance, CEOs in the marketplace might not 
know when a competitor will launch a new product, or 
students applying for a summer internship might not 
know the caliber of the other students with whom they 
are competing. Uncertainty prompts social comparison 
(Festinger, 1954; Gerard, 1963; S. E. Taylor, Buunk, & 
Aspinwall, 1990; Suls & Wills, 1991; Wood, 1996), as “peri-
ods of stress, novelty, or change should temporarily 
increase the amount of comparison” (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999, p. 130; see also Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; B. P. 
Buunk, 1994; Molleman, Pruyn, & van Knippenberg, 
1986). Evidence linking uncertainty to competitiveness 
through comparison concerns is limited, however. One 
exception from social dilemmas research suggests that 
when environmental uncertainty is high, people cooper-
ate less with others than when environmental uncertainty 
is low (Wit & Wilke, 1999). Additional support for 
the likely impact of uncertainty can be gleaned from 
research that found that comparison concerns and com-
petitiveness—which are generally high in the proximity of 
a standard like the top rank—decrease dramatically when 
uncertainty about one’s ranking relative to a rival is 
removed (Garcia & Tor, 2007). Thus, further study of this 
potential situational factor is merited.
Avenues for Future Research
By distinguishing between individual and situational 
social comparison factors in competitiveness, our model 
both reinterprets a significant portion of the extant litera-
ture on social comparison and related phenomena and 
highlights promising new research directions.
Interaction within individual and 
situational factors
An important set of questions concerns the interaction 
among the variables within each of the respective catego-
ries of individual and situational variables. Regarding 
individual factors, one indication of the possible interac-
tion among different individual variables comes from the 
self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988), which 
focuses on the “hydraulic” nature of relevance and close-
ness. Suppose your chess performance is a relevant 
dimension and that you and a close friend begin to play 
chess together but your friend consistently outperforms 
you. The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts two 
possible outcomes: (a) Playing chess will become less 
relevant for you, or (b) you will become less close to 
your friend (Tesser, 1988). Otherwise, your chess games 
with your friend will remain highly competitive, or you 
will no longer play with your friend.2 This hydraulic pro-
cess also applies to similarity, suggesting that being con-
sistently outperformed by a similar counterpart will likely 
lead you (a) to perceive the task at hand as being less 
relevant or (b) to reassess your counterpart’s similarity. 
When neither outcome occurs, the game will remain 
highly competitive, or you will exit.
Figure 2, however, highlights a further potential inter-
action between target and dimension that Tesser (1988) 
does not directly address, raising the question of whether 
it is possible for a dimension to become relevant to the 
actor simply because it is relevant to a close or similar 
target. Although there is no direct research on this 
question, perhaps we witness this effect in real life. 
Regarding closeness, for example, certain recreational 
games that are important to a close friend may become 
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more relevant to us, and we may even become more 
competitive when playing them with that friend. When 
playing these games with a stranger, in contrast, we might 
not be motivated to compete if performance would 
remain irrelevant. Thus, targets perhaps have the poten-
tial to influence the relevance of the dimension.
Other psychological processes, such as cognitive 
accessibility or salience (Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, & 
Nosak, 2007; Bargh, 1996), may better describe the likely 
interaction among situational factors. The specifics of a 
given situation determine the relative salience—and con-
sequently the impact—of different situational variables. 
For example, if an actor is tied with two rivals at rank 
number four, there will likely be fierce competition, as 
the three rivals are also proximate to a standard. We can-
not specify the intensity of the competition among them, 
however, because we do not know the respective contri-
bution of proximity to a standard versus N or even 
whether their effects are additive and whether their addi-
tion exhibits diminishing returns (Hodges, 1973). If, for 
example, proximity to a standard trumps N, and if an 
actor ranked 24th is tied with two other rivals at this rank, 
then competition for the number 23 rank would not be 
fierce; if N trumps proximity to a standard, then competi-
tion would still be fierce. More generally, the salience of 
environmental cues (Ross & Nisbett, 1991) will likely 
govern the influence of these contextual, situational vari-
ables, but further research is needed to examine whether 
these factors generate additive or interactive effects.
Interaction between situational and 
individual factors
Our model helps identify further open questions regard-
ing the nature of the process by which situational factors 
shape comparison concerns and competiveness. The 
extant research reviewed here implicitly assumes that 
situational factors directly shape comparison concerns 
and, consequently, competitiveness. However, Figure 2 
highlights the possibility that situational factors influence 
comparison concerns and competiveness indirectly, via 
the individual factors. For example, perhaps the situa-
tional variables of proximity to a standard or N operate 
by affecting the individual variable of dimension rele-
vance; as distance from a standard or N increases, per-
haps the relevance of the dimension itself decreases, 
thereby diminishing comparison concerns and competi-
tiveness. To illustrate, suppose a highly ranked golfer 
considers golf ability as a self-relevant performance 
dimension. However, if he falls in the rankings (or is sur-
rounded by an increasing number of golfers of similar 
ability), golf ability may become less relevant to him, 
thereby decreasing his competitiveness. The opposite 
may obtain when a recreational golfer rises up the 
ranking (or starts playing with fewer competitors), with 
golf performance becoming self-relevant, increasing com-
petitiveness. In either case, dimension relevance might 
prove a necessary precondition for competitiveness.
Another question concerns the interplay between 
social category fault lines, a situational factor, and simi-
larity, an individual factor. Under some circumstances, 
members of the same social category might become 
more competitive toward each other because of their 
similarity despite the salience of social category fault 
lines. This can occur, for example, when social category 
lines, such as gender or race, form the basis of the incen-
tive structure (e.g., Garcia & Ybarra, 2007). If the finalists 
for the “employee of the month” award always include 
one male and one female, competition will likely be 
fierce among contenders from the same focal social cat-
egory (i.e., females among females and males among 
males), despite the salience of such fault lines. Moreover, 
in this example, whether fault lines (which diminish in-
group competition) or similarity (which increases it) 
dominate can depend on the incentive structure.
Apart from the more static interaction between and 
within situational and individual factors in a single time 
period, the potential role of dynamic changes over time in 
the factors shaping social comparison processes merits 
consideration. A given level of a situational factor that 
ordinarily increases competitive behavior—say, a small 
number of competitors—may exert a diminished impact 
over time, as a result of adaptation (Brickman & Campbell, 
1971). The individual factors of social comparison are 
likely to change over time as well, as people develop and 
change for a variety of reasons, from age to life events 
and more.
Limitations
The research we draw on to build the present framework 
principally used participants from Western, more indi-
vidualistic cultures, raising the possibility that this frame-
work is culture specific and may not apply to Eastern 
cultures that construe the self as part of a larger network 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). We think it plausible, how-
ever, that some dynamics underlying competitiveness 
may be common across cultures (Tang, 1999; Toda, 
Shinotsuka, McClintock, & Stech, 1978), though both the 
base rates of social comparison and competitiveness and 
the impact of certain variables we identify may be culture 
dependent (A. P. Buunk, Carmona, Peiró, Dijkstra, & 
Dijkstra, 2011). For example, Chinese precollege students 
use competitive strategies, whereas American precollege 
students use cooperative strategies in the realm of test 
taking (Tang, 1999). Yet this difference is not cultural per 
se, rather resulting from different institutional structures 
of testing: college entrance exams are a onetime event in 
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China but repeatable in the United States. Accordingly, a 
study comparing the strategies used by students in the 
two cultures found that the psychological predictors of 
“competitive types” and “cooperative types” did not vary 
by culture or origin (Tang, 1999).
The same may hold for the impact of individual and 
situational factors, which can remain influential despite 
significant differences in their concrete cross-cultural 
manifestations. To illustrate, a common Japanese maxim 
states that “the nail that sticks out gets hammered,” sug-
gesting it may be more important for Japanese relative to 
American populations to avoid falling behind the com-
petition than to break ahead of the competition. Indeed, 
findings indicate that the Japanese may be slightly more 
motivated than Americans by being ranked near the bot-
tom, whereas Americans may be slightly more motivated 
near the top rank (Heine et al., 2001). In this case, there-
fore, the situational factor of proximity to a standard 
matters but manifests differently across cultures.
A New Social Comparison Lens
The present framework contributes to social psychology 
in particular by synthesizing the early postulated yet 
underdeveloped connection between social comparison 
and competitiveness (Festinger, 1954). It reorganizes 
both early and more recent research of this realm into the 
distinct categories of individual and situational factors 
and examines the relationships among them. No less 
important, our model also offers new lessons and gener-
ates important research questions across other subfields 
of psychology and even for disciplines beyond psychol-
ogy that intersect with the study of competition, from 
political science and economics, through business and 
strategy, to law and public policy.
Across psychology
Personality psychology. One important personality 
variable that merits further consideration in competition 
is gender. Males reveal a stronger preference than females 
for tournament-based incentives over noncompetitive 
piece-rate incentives (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
Females also exhibit greater discomfort than males in 
competition in same-sex dyads and tetrads (Benenson et 
al., 2002). Yet extant research does not tell us whether 
gender operates directly as a personal factor on social 
comparison processes and competitiveness. Moreover, 
research also needs to explore the specific effects, if any, 
that gender has on these processes. For instance, does 
gender influence self-selection into competitions or self-
selection out of competitions besides influencing behav-
ior within a competition? If males were shown to prefer 
larger competitions than females do and females 
generally to be less competitive than males, selection 
into and competitive behavior in naturally occurring 
competitions could generate an overrepresentation of 
males in larger competitions.
Organizational psychology. The framework’s situa-
tional factors particularly illuminate employee motivation 
(Latham, 2011). For example, although individual-based 
feedback (Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981) can curb 
social loafing on collective tasks (Latané, Williams, & 
Harkins, 1979), our model reveals that motivational defi-
cits still occur even on individual-based tasks, as the 
number of employees increases. Thus, commission-based 
sales agents and other workers doing the same task indi-
vidually would likely exhibit better performance if they 
were based in relatively small branch offices (or another 
smaller-N environment) instead of, say, a single large 
warehouse.
The framework also suggests that common calls for 
ranking employees to boost productivity (Grote, 2005; 
Hazels & Sasse, 2008) should recognize that ranking’s 
effect on productivity depends on whether the workers’ 
tasks require cooperation and information exchange. 
Highly ranked individuals could become less likely to 
collaborate for the benefit of the organization, instead 
focusing on maintaining their rank. But rankings indeed 
might generate positive effects when individuals work 
autonomously (Cherry & Ellis, 2005). A similar analysis 
applies to social category fault lines. If collaboration 
across groups is required, social category fault lines can 
be detrimental to organizational success, but if collabora-
tion is not required, employees from different depart-
ments, for example, could be motivated to outdo each 
other in myriad ways (i.e., greater effort, volunteering, or 
conservation) to the benefit of the organization overall 
(Lount & Phillips, 2007).
Consumer psychology. Conspicuous consumption eas-
ily becomes a race (Frank, 2010; Lee & Shrum, 2012; 
Ordabayeva & Chandon, 2011; Podolny, 2005), especially 
as people often consume high-status goods to compen-
sate for personal deficiencies (i.e., self-threat: Pettit & 
Sivanathan, 2011; little power: Rucker & Galinsky, 2009; 
minority status: Charles, Hurst, & Roussanov, 2009). Given 
the link between self-threat and social comparison (Tes-
ser, 1988), our framework can offer predictions regarding 
conspicuous consumption. For example, whereas low-
power individuals seek high-status goods in the abstract, 
they may experience decreased comparison concerns 
among many “competing” consumers, with a concomi-
tant decrease in conspicuous consumption. Similarly, 
proximity to a standard suggests that highly ranked indi-
viduals in terms of wealth may be more vulnerable to 
comparison concerns in that domain, tending more to 
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compete in a conspicuous consumption race with simi-
larly high-ranked peers.
Educational psychology. One prevailing approach to 
student achievement is based on expectancy value mod-
els (Ajzen, 1988; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) that view moti-
vation as a function of one’s expectancies and the 
perceived goal value. However, the present framework 
suggests that situational factors may influence achieve-
ment motivation, even controlling for expected values. 
For instance, the N-effect findings revealed a situational 
variable that decreases achievement motivation even in 
ad hoc test-taking sessions. In the same vein, although 
norm referencing (i.e., ranking systems) is more likely 
than criterion referencing to boost overall student motiva-
tion (Cherry & Ellis, 2005), it may have a hidden cost as 
well. Our model suggests that intermediately ranked stu-
dents—possibly the majority of all students—may become 
less motivated than those at the extremes. Fostering com-
petitiveness in the classroom writ large can be detrimental 
to learning (Kohn, 1992), however, so increasing compe-
tiveness may be better suited for test-taking and similar 
situations, once the material already has been learned and 
individual effort is of paramount importance.
Evolutionary psychology. Our framework potentially 
speaks to the role of evolutionary processes in social 
comparison and competition. For instance, situational 
factors might have evolved early. Nonhuman primates 
appear susceptible to the dynamics of being in the prox-
imity to a standard, expressing sensitivity to rankings and 
hierarchies (e.g., Beehner, Bergman, Cheney, Seyfarth, & 
Whitten, 2006; Bergman, Beehner, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 
2003; Sapolsky, 2005) as well as to social category fault 
lines, distinguishing between the in-group and out-
groups (Bergman et al., 2003). Even more primitive spe-
cies, such as beetle larvae (Smiseth & Moore, 2004) and 
cockroaches (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969), 
appear sensitive to the number of competitors. Thus, sit-
uational factors may have evolved before individual fac-
tors, which require a relatively more sophisticated level 
of theory of mind (Ruys & Aarts, 2010).
Beyond psychology
Economics. Experimental economics (Camerer, 2003; 
Kagel & Roth, 1995; Plott & Smith, 2008) pays great 
attention to the study of key interpersonal preferences 
(i.e., fairness, reciprocity, altruism, or inequity aversion) 
that traditionally have been deemed irrational and out-
side standard economic models (e.g., Charness & Rabin, 
2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 2003; 
Levitt & List, 2007). Yet experimental economists have 
mostly ignored the contribution of the social comparison 
processes to these preferences beyond noting their pos-
sible role (Frey & Meier, 2004). Our framework highlights 
the need for further study in this area, particularly with 
respect to the systematic effects of the situational factors 
of social comparison on social preferences. After all, the 
findings we reviewed with respect to these determinants 
of competitiveness—such as proximity to a standard or 
the number of competitors—are likely to exert similar 
effects through the social comparison process on indi-
viduals’ tendency to cooperative, reciprocate, tolerate 
inequitable outcomes, and more.
Business and strategy. Competitive strategy is con-
cerned with the ways companies compete and seek to 
gain an advantage in the market vis-à-vis their competi-
tors. The framework we offer gives social comparison 
research an opportunity to inform the strategy field by 
providing insight into the operation of rivalry and sup-
plementing areas of strategy that focus on the role of 
positional concerns in competitive dynamics (e.g., Deep-
house, 1999; D. Miller & Chen, 1994). In some cases, 
our model provides further support, for instance, to the 
five-forces model that predicts “rivalry among existing 
competitors” (Porter, 1980, 2008) and suggests that com-
petition intensifies when rivals are similar in size or 
when they compete on the same dimension (Porter, 
2008)—both of which predictions echo the relational, 
individual factor of similarity and the personal, individ-
ual factor of relevance. In other cases, however, our 
model helps identify limits to the accepted wisdom in 
business strategy, which believes rivalry is most intense 
if competitors are numerous (Porter, 1980, 2008), by 
pointing out the diminished competitiveness in large-N 
settings. Our model also complements prevailing microp-
erspectives on strategy, such as the awareness–motiva-
tion–capability framework (M. J. Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007), 
which predicts the likelihood of a competitor respond-
ing to another competitor (i.e., aware of the action, moti-
vated to react, and capable of responding). Here, our 
model helps better predict the motivation to react to 
specific competitors. It also helps fill a void documented 
in the strategy literature where the study of “competitive 
dynamics remains notably underdeveloped in several 
key respects” (M. J. Chen & Miller, 2012, p. 136), includ-
ing the “potential to bridge micro and macro perspec-
tives within the discipline” and make “fruitful links to 
other disciplines in the management field” (M. J. Chen & 
Miller, 2012, p. 136).
Political science. Elections—an important type of 
competition—are a key area of study. Political scientists 
are interested, for one, in the competitive dynamics of 
primary elections (e.g., Ansolabehere, Hansen, Hirano, 
& Snyder, 2010; Snyder & Ting, 2011). Applying some 
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situational factors of our framework to primary elections, 
we would predict that competitiveness among candidates 
decreases when the number of primary candidates is 
high versus low. Our framework also predicts that candi-
dates who are highly ranked, say, in terms of weekly 
polls will be more likely to spar with each other than 
those who are not. Moreover, individual factors also 
apply. For instance, candidates who perceive themselves 
as similar to each other will be more likely to spar than 
those who believe they are dissimilar.
Law. Our model offers lessons for many legal areas that 
need to account for social preferences and concerns 
regarding one’s relative position or outcomes (e.g., 
Davidson, 2009; Frank & Sunstein, 2001; Hovenkamp, 
1994; McAdams, 1992). To illustrate, property law schol-
arship has emphasized the role of property in communi-
cating one’s relative position in social settings (Davidson, 
2009); yet the status function of property can skew indi-
viduals’ incentives to trade and invest in property, lead-
ing to social welfare losses. The situational factors of 
social comparison suggest, however, that this status func-
tion may be particularly harmful in small-N settings, 
among particularly high- or low-ranked individuals, 
across social category fault lines, and so on. Similar anal-
ysis can inform other legal areas (i.e., tax law: McAdams, 
1992; antidiscrimination law: Donohue, 1986, 1989; Pos-
ner, 1987, 1989) where the intensity of concerns over 
relative position versus superior overall outcomes is of 
great interest, as well as advance the more recent scholar-
ship that draw on behavioral insights for legal analysis 
( Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998; Korobkin & Ulen, 2000; 
Tor, 2008; Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010).
Public policy. The framework’s focus on situational 
factors suggests how policy makers could be both attuned 
to the impact of these variables and ready to use them to 
improve policy. One issue pertains to the fairness and 
efficacy of standard testing practices (e.g., L. Bond, 1995) 
on important standardized exams, such as the SAT. Draw-
ing on the N effect, for instance, one overlooked factor is 
the number of test takers showing up to take a standard-
ized exam. As the number of test takers reporting to any 
given test-taking venue increases, test takers may feel less 
motivated to do well on the exam and therefore exhibit 
inferior performance. Modified testing practices can take 
this and other situational variables into account and stan-
dardize the size and other neglected features of test-tak-
ing venues, ensuring greater fairness and efficacy of 
important tests. Moreover, in light of the No Child Left 
Behind Act (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2001), the situa-
tional factors of social comparison bear implications for 
the measurement of teacher effectiveness (and some-
times pay) as well as for evaluations at the school, dis-
trict, or state levels.
Conclusion
In sum, the social comparison model of competition dis-
tinguishes individual from situational factors of social 
comparison that influence competitive behavior. We 
hope that the present review will join other programs of 
psychological research in helping invigorate the develop-
ment of a unique psychological perspective in the inter-
disciplinary study of competition. Ideally, the new 
framework developed here will also offer a broad foun-
dation, allowing those many subfields of psychology as 
well as other, related disciplines more effectively and 
extensively to draw on the rich and important findings 
from the social comparison perspective.
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Notes
1. Note that the situational factor of social category fault lines is 
qualitatively different from the individual factor of similarity. For 
example, being within social category fault lines—where the 
actor shares a “similar” social category with a target—decreases 
social comparison concerns. Conversely, the individual factor 
of similarity—in the absence of salient social category fault 
line in the environment—has the opposite effect of increasing 
social comparison concerns. The same analysis could apply to 
relationship closeness, as in-group members are likely to feel 
“close” to one another. The theory of optimal distinctiveness 
(Brewer, 2003), which explains a contrasting desire for individ-
ual distinctiveness and social identification with a group, offers 
additional insight on this dynamic.
2. Incidentally, if Outcome A happens, then you can actually 
begin to bask in the glory of your friend’s success at chess.
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